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Abstract
We conduct experiments in the ￿eld with people who live in urban slums to measure
trust and cooperation and to see how behavior varies with demographic factors and
associational measures of social capital. Overall, we ￿nd high rates of contributions
among Thai and Vietnamese participants in a voluntary contribution game and we
see that many participants are willing to socially sanction other participants who
free ride. At the individual level, we ￿nd that behavior varies with many demo-
graphic factors (e.g., sex, schooling, age) and with many associational factors (e.g.,
home ownership and community homogeneity). However, many of these correlations
diﬀer signi￿cantly between our Thai participants and our Vietnamese participants
indicating the role of culture.
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Dilemma, Experiment, Thailand, Vietnam
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A current trend in the economic development literature is to identify and un-
derstand how the more social aspects of individual and community behavior
contribute to (or detract from) economic performance. 2 Much of this litera-
ture has been grouped under a poorly de￿ned term ￿ social capital. The term is
poorly de￿ned because, to one set of researchers, social capital is de￿ned as the
propensities of individuals to trust, cooperate, and punish other individuals
that act to establish and maintain prosocial norms of behavior (e.g., Fukuyama
(1995), Bowles and Gintis (2002), or Glaeser et al. (2002)). At the same time,
however, to other researchers social capital means the community level net-
works among individuals that lead to eﬃcient outcomes when contracts are
hard to enforce (e.g., Putnam (2000)). Despite an outpouring of research using
both of these de￿nitions of social capital, there remains signi￿cant conceptual
confusion regarding the aspects of communities and individuals that demon-
strate social capital. To be more speci￿c, we think of the ￿rst de￿nition as
behavioral social capital and the second as associational social capital.O n eo f
o u rp u r p o s e si st os e a r c hf o rl i n k sb e t w e e nt h e s et w od e ￿nitions.
As if conceptual problems were not enough to overcome, social capital re-
search is also confounded by measurement and estimation issues (Durlauf
(2002)). Speci￿cally, the diﬀerent de￿nitions of social capital lead to diﬀerent
strategies for measuring its eﬀects. At the individual level, researchers look
for behavioral measures of trust, trustworthiness, and cooperation all in the
(implied) context of social dilemmas where individual incentives are at odds
with collective eﬃciency. These measures typically come from surveyed self-
reports of behavior and attitudes. A representative question from the general
social survey (GSS) is, ￿Generally speaking, would you say that most people
can be trusted, or that you can￿t be too careful in dealing with people?￿ Re-
search that focuses on the associational de￿nition of social capital, while also
typically based on self-reports from surveys, asks less hypothetical and more
factual questions such as, ￿How many volunteer organizations do you belong
to?￿
1 We thank Anchana NaRanong (NIDA, Bangkok), Nguyen Quang Vinh, and Van
Thi Ngoc Lan (ISSHO, HCM City) for their help in conducting this research. We
also thank Jon Isham, Peter Matthews, Jean-Robert Tyran, Chris Winship and the
participants in the 2003 Trust and Institutions seminar at the Kennedy School of
Government for comments. Support for this project came from the UCal. Paci￿c
Rim Research Program, the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of
Canada, and the NSF (SES-CAREER 0092953).
2 Examples include Desdoigts (1999), Knack and Keefer (1997), and Woolcock
(1995). The near exponential growth of such research is documented in Isham et al.
(2002).
2It is not news that surveys are an imperfect way to gather information about
individual behavior, but their practical advantages (i.e., they are compara-
tively cheap to conduct and often provide a large sample) continue to make
them popular research tools. The bene￿ts of surveys, however, may be out-
weighed in the case of behavioral social capital. While there surely exists mea-
surement error in the more factual network questions, if for no other reason
than because respondents are careless, hypothetical questions about behav-
ior add other biases that may be more worrisome because they tend to be
systematic. As just one example, who wants to think of him or herself as
untrustworthy? 3
Our second purpose is to report on an attempt to measure behavioral so-
cial capital in the ￿eld using experiments instead of surveys. We hypothesize
that experiments provide more accurate measures of behavioral social capital
because paying participants based on their choices provides an incentive to
take the exercise seriously (especially when the stakes are high) and because
participants must risk money to trust or cooperate. That is, providing incen-
tives for our participants should reduce much of the ￿noise￿ associated with
hypothetical survey measures of prosocial behavior.
Our study is unique for four reasons. First, while much of the work on social
capital is focused on residents of the industrialized west, our participants are
from Southeast Asia. Second, instead of using students, our participants live
and work in urban slums. Speci￿cally, our research brought us to ￿ve commu-
nities in Bangkok and ￿ve communities in Ho Chi Minh City. We ￿nd these
populations particularly interesting because people in the developing world of-
ten face social dilemmas on a daily basis and therefore may behave diﬀerently
in situations that require trust or cooperation than students in the industrial-
ized west. With this fact in mind, our results should be more directly relevant
for studies of poverty and development 4. Third, instead of using the popular
Berg et al. (1995) investment game to measure trust and cooperation (as in
Ashraf et al. (2003), Croson and Buchan (1999), Carter and Castillo (2002))
we employ a voluntary contribution experiment (like Gaechter et al. (2003))
in which cooperative acts measure the degree to which participants trust that
other participants will also cooperate. Fourth, because we also gathered asso-
ciational data in a post-experiment interview, we examine the links between
associations and behavior.
We begin in the next section by describing the communities which are home
3 See Carpenter (2002a) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) for an expanded
discussion of the diﬃculties of using surveys to elicit behavioral data.
4 For evidence supporting this view see Henrich et al. (2001) who show that the
variance in behavior in a simple bargaining experiment conducted in the ￿eld in
￿fteen small-scale societies can be explained by the extent to which cooperation is
needed in local production.
3to our participants. In section 3 we describe our experiment. In section 4 we
provide an overview of our ￿ndings. In section 5 we examine the individual
determinants of cooperation and trust. Section 6 lists the diﬀerences we ￿nd
between our Thai participants and our Vietnamese participants and we list a
few concluding thoughts in section 7.
1 Background and Community Descriptions
W ec o n d u c t e ds u r v e y sa n de x p e r i m e n t si nt e nu r b a ns l u m si nS o u t h e a s tA s i a .
Our primary interest in these slums, the cities of Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh
and in this region in general, is that while the area is experiencing rapid
growth and urbanization, a signi￿cant portion of the population is increasingly
marginalized. The resulting increase in inequality, speci￿cally, is the source
of serious concern for policy makers in the region (Fritzen (2002), Kakwani
and Krongkaew (2000)). Because many of the marginalized end up in urban
slums where economic opportunities are scarce and health and environmental
problems are abundant, we are interested in the determinants of trust and
cooperation under these circumstances.
Southeast Asia is a region composed of several economic tigers surrounded by
a few countries where little has changed or improved in the past half century
(Cambodia, Laos and Myamar/Burma). 5 Thailand and Vietnam, however,
represent relative success stories in this rapidly industrializing part of the
developing world although their paths to success could not, at least until
recently, have been more diﬀerent. Aside from the basic similarities of religion,
size of population, geographic endowments, etc., the political economy of the
two nations diﬀer in many, if not all, respects.
Thailand, and speci￿cally Bangkok, has adopted a generally laissez faire ap-
proach to economic development in the last thirty years. As such, the gov-
ernment of Thailand has permitted and, some argue, even encouraged the
extreme concentration of industrial, manufacturing, commercial and service
sectors within the Bangkok Metropolitan Region. While several steps have
been taken since the early 1990s to support the deconcentration of economic
activities to smaller cities within 100 or so miles of Bangkok, these eﬀorts have
had relatively little eﬀect on Bangkok￿s rate of growth.
Bangkok has expanded exponentially since the end of Vietnam War era and
5 There is increasing debate regarding the actual level of success of so-called tiger
economies of Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia given the relatively limited growth
these countries are still experiencing six years after the beginning of the Asian crisis
(Singh and Freeman (2001)).
4now encompasses 12 million people (out of a total population of 64 million
Thais). The land mass occupied by these residents and their places of em-
ployment extends far beyond the traditional city core and into vast suburban
and even rural landscapes. The city itself is extremely dense, congested and
dirty although Bangkok￿s Metropolitan Authority (the local government) has
attempted, with the support of the central government, to ease traﬃc, im-
prove sanitation, and deliver cleaner water. The lack of an eﬀective means of
enforcement of environmental and economic regulations, however, as well as a
reluctance on the part of the Thai government in invest in physical and social
infrastructure on a major scale, has contributed to the relatively unfortunate
situation of hundreds of thousands of slum dwellers.
Recent media accounts have indicated a growing public dissatisfaction with
environmental conditions, expressed through public protests focused on air
and water pollution. Local mobilization such as urban squatter associations,
loosely organized through NGOs and/or community groups, can in speci￿c
circumstances, particularly with the assistance of well-placed contacts in the
Bangkok Metropolitan Authority or one of the national level ministries, achieve
substantial improvements in local quality of life. Squatter settlements have
obtained piped water connections, structural upgrades or day care centers as
well as improved land tenure arrangements through local organization and
lobbying of key bureaucrats. Thus, social capital within communities could
potentially be of great value to slum dwellers in terms of the potential of net-
works and trust to encourage economic and community development (Daniere
et al. (2002)).
The political economy of Vietnam has been transformed since 1986 and the
introduction of doi moi (meaning renovation but actually describing the liber-
alization process). The center of economic growth in Vietnam is Ho Chi Minh
City. Although slightly more than one-third the size of Bangkok, Ho Chi Minh
City has experienced extremely rapid expansion, leading to its characteriza-
tion as the world￿s next ￿Bangkok￿ (Drakakis-Smith and Dixon (1997)). There
has been widespread expansion in the urban area and many additional house-
holds have moved to the city to be closer to opportunities even without the
correct paperwork that allows them to dwell inside the metropolis.
While the Vietnamese communist party tolerates neither any public advocacy
of ideological or political pluralism nor any citizen￿s criticism of its foreign
policies, the relationship between the state and society in Vietnam is consid-
erably more dynamic and is changing much more rapidly than is generally
perceived. In particular, non-registered locally based voluntary associations
have sprung up all over the country in the last ￿fteen years. They include
same-village or same-province associations in the large cities to alumni, same-
military-service, rotating credit associations, and so on. While none of these
new associations are political in their orientation, the ties formed through
5them have been mobilized for collective action and for a concerted voice for
better local governance (Luong (2003)). As such, community groups and ward-
level People￿s Committees are beginning to have a say in how their budgets
are allocated within their boundaries. Hence, social capital and the ability to
organize and work together to initiate local change is very much part of the
urban landscape in Vietnam.
W h i l et h e r ea r em a n yd i ﬀerences in the politics, economics and cultures be-
tween the two cities, the challenges faced are somewhat similar because of
two factors: Vietnam will likely continue to depend on doi moi to help jump
start its economy; and both Thailand and Vietnam are increasingly exposed
to foreign investment and the consumer culture of the West apparent in most
globalizing cities (Kim et al. (1997)). Consequently, poor urban communities
are likely to ￿nd themselves without many options and both national and
urban governments will be looking to discover new and cost-eﬀective strate-
gies to sustain economic growth. Community participation and the role played
by social capital remain key factors believed by international donor agencies,
NGOs, and government agencies to be vital to the potential success of urban
environmental policies.
To measure the level of social capital and trust in poor urban communities
of Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh City, we conducted experimental games and a
post experiment survey in ￿ve low-income communities in each city. 6
In Bangkok, the communities were selected through the use of a sampling
frame developed from a study of Bangkok slums (Setchell (1992)) and the
local expertise of the project team and their contacts. The communities were
not selected randomly but are generally representative of the broad range of
slums and squatter areas in terms of size, history, location and environmen-
tal conditions that one might see in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region. The
selection criteria included low average per capita or household income and
disparate locations in order to ensure that there would be some variation in
terms of access to services (see Daniere et al. (2002)). We contacted the neigh-
borhood organization or community leaders in each of the neighborhoods to
request permission to work with the community. Each of the ￿ve communities
we approached agreed to work with us. In the case of experimental games, po-
tential participants were told about the opportunity to play through lea￿ets
and community announcements. Participants were asked to meet at a central
location, generally the local community center or day care, if they wanted to
volunteer for the games. The players were randomly selected from among the
volunteers gathered at the site.
6 The names, locations and brief descriptions of the diﬀerent communities can
be found together with the experimental instructions and our survey on line at
http://community. middlebury.edu/~jcarpent/papers.html.
6To select communities in Ho Chi Minh City, we needed to rely to a greater
degree on local knowledge and connections. The slum communities could not
be selected from a sampling frame but were proposed by the People￿s Commit-
tees responsible for speci￿c city districts instead. We approached ￿ve diﬀerent
districts and asked them to nominate one or two of their most impoverished
wards or communities for inclusion in the project. Since the research project
has the support of the Vietnamese government and one of our project team
members is a government employee at the Institute for Social Sciences, we
were able to conduct our research relatively free of control or interference.
It is possible, of course, that we were directed to showpiece communities al-
though given our extensive travels throughout the city, this seems unlikely to
us and to our Vietnamese colleagues.
Playing or conducting experimental games in Ho Chi Minh City was
somewhat more complicated than in the Bangkok communities. We chose to
conduct the games in one or two of the meeting rooms within the Institute
for Social Sciences as it proved to be the least disruptive to communities,
as well as the most free of party (or People￿s Committee) monitoring. Par-
ticipants from the diﬀerent communities who volunteered for the experiment
were transported by van or taxi to the center, played the game and were then
provided transportation back to their communities. As in Bangkok, potential
participants were informed that the game would result in immediate earnings;
there was no lack of volunteers.
2 Our Experimental Protocol
Our ￿eld experiments were conducted during the summer of 2002 and con-
sisted of a hand-run version of the voluntary contribution mechanism (Isaac
et al. (1984)) in which players were organized into groups and individually
decided how much to contribute to a public good.
For us, trust is the willingness to abandon strategic deliberation (in particular
subgame perfection), making one vulnerable to others, in the belief that one
will be better oﬀ as a result. With this de￿nition in mind, a number of exper-
imental games may be used to measure trust. As mentioned above, a popular
experiment is the Berg et al. (1995) investment game in which a ￿rst mover
sends money through the experimenter to a second mover. Any money that
is sent is multiplied by a factor greater than one so that sending is socially
eﬃcient. The second mover can then send any fraction of the amount she re-
ceives back to the ￿r s tm o v e r .I nt h i sc o n t e x t ,t h ea m o u n ts e n tb yt h e￿rst
mover is thought to measure trust. There are also a number of discrete choice
games with incentives that are similar to the investment game (e.g., McCabe
et al. (1996), Eckel and Wilson (2002), McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), Gueth
7et al. (1997)).
In psychology, there has been a tradition of associating trust with being coop-
erative in the prisoner￿s dilemma (see Deutsch (1973)) and this area of research
has, more recently, been explored by economists and political scientists (e.g.
Ahn et al. (1999) and Ahn et al. (2003)). Indeed, experimental studies have
established a link between trust and cooperative acts in two-person prisoner￿s
dilemma games (see Messick et al. (1983), Parks and Hulbert (1995), and
Parks et al. (1996)). Based on this research, we chose to study trust by imple-
menting the voluntary contribution game as the four-person generalization of
the prisoner￿s dilemma.
We gathered data from 240 participants (120 from each city). Our 240 partici-
pants were split into 60 four-person groups and the composition of the groups
remained the same for the entire experiment. This is known as the partners
protocol. There were six groups from each of the ten communities. Our proce-
dures are interesting from an experimental point of view because, unlike most
other experiments, we controlled for the gender composition of our groups. In
each community, we formed two all-male groups, two all-female groups, and
two half male half female groups.
The experiment typically lasted less than two hours including instructions,
payment, and an exit survey. We were concerned about the size of the potential
earnings, so we calibrated the payoﬀs at the social optimum to be between
one-half and slightly more than one weeks wages (based on local industrial
wages which were approximately $44 in Thailand and $12 in Vietnam). In
practice, our Thai players earned $21.62 and our Vietnamese players earned
$12.42, on average.
The experiment consisted of two treatments and a total of ten rounds. In
the ￿rst ￿ve rounds, participants played a standard voluntary contribution
g a m ea n di nt h es e c o n d￿ve rounds, the game was modi￿ed to allow players
to socially sanction (i.e., show their disapproval of) free riders. This game is
interesting because it allows us to assess how cooperative and trusting play-
ers are by how much they contribute to the public good, but the game also
allows us to assess players willingness to express their dissatisfaction with the
contributions of others.
The details of our experimental procedures are as follows. During the ￿rst ￿ve
rounds each player was endowed with ten monetary units: ten 1000 Dong bills
in Vietnam or ten 5 Bhat coins in Thailand. 7 One at a time, each member
of a group walked behind a blind set up to make decisions as anonymous
7 A tt h et i m eo ft h ee x p e r i m e n tt h eD o l l a r￿D o n ge x c h a n g er a t ew a sa p p r o x i m a t e l y
$1=15,000 VND and the Dollar ￿ Bhat exchange rate was approximately $1=40
Bhat.
8as possible. Once behind the blind each group member contributed as many
of her ten unit endowment as she wanted to a ￿group project.￿ Each player
then placed the rest of her endowment in an opaque, color-coded envelope and
returned to her seat.
Once all the group members made their contributions, the experimenter wrote
each of the four contributions on a slip of paper in random order (to keep
them anonymous) and calculated the sum. One at a time, the players then
returned behind the blind to see how much had been contributed individually
and collectively to the group project. At this point each person in the group
received her payoﬀ from the group project which was an equal share of the
sum of the group contributions doubled. Each person put her share of the
group project in her envelope and then returned to her seat. This process was
repeated ￿ve times.
Our procedures create a social dilemma for the subjects because everyone has
a material incentive to free ride on the contributions of others. The per period
payoﬀ to player i who contributes xi is:





which implies that every monetary unit contributed returns only half a unit
to the contributor and therefore contributing zero is the dominant strategy.
However, what makes this a dilemma is the fact that if everyone contributes
fully, everyone in the group receives 20 monetary units instead of the 10t h e y
receive when everyone uses the dominant strategy. Hence, xi is a behavioral
measure of a person￿s propensity to trust and cooperate in the face of the
material incentive to not cooperate.
Rounds six through ten were run exactly like rounds one through ￿ve accept
for one change in the procedures. 8 Now, when players returned behind the
blind to see what everyone had contributed and to pick up their shares of
the group project, they were given the opportunity to sanction the rest of the
group if they did not like the group￿s contribution pro￿le. Speci￿cally, each
player was asked whether or not she wanted to have a picture displayed that
meant she was unhappy with what the others had contributed. The picture
was meant to be easy to interpret. We chose an unhappy face.
It was costly to have the picture displayed so that, like contributing, showing
8 The players did not know that the rules would change until after round 5 was com-
pleted. We did this to prevent any confounds associated with players anticipating
the rule change.
9disapproval was dominated by remaining silent. It cost 200 Dong in Vietnam
and 1 Bhat in Thailand to display a picture. Any purchased pictures were
displayed at the beginning of the next round so that the sources of the pictures
were anonymous. This procedure means that players saw between zero and
four pictures when they made their next contribution decisions.
Because it was costly to sanction the other players in one￿s group, individu-
als could always do better by free riding on the sanctioning done by others.
By backward induction, knowing that sanctioning is dominated, free riders
should not fear sanctions, so the only subgame perfect equilibrium of this ￿-
nitely repeated game is to continue to free ride. 9 D e s p i t et h es u b g a m ep e r f e c t
prediction, if players do sanction it is a behavioral measure of their willingness
to incur a cost to express their disapproval of others.
3D a t a O v e r v i e w
Table 1 summarizes three aspects of our participants: their demographics,
their associational social capital, and their behavior in our experiment. By
design, our participants were half men and half women. On average, our Thai
participants had ￿nished grade school and our Vietnamese participants had
made it through junior high school. This diﬀerence in educational attainment
is signi￿cant (t=8.36, p<0.01). Our participants are much older than the stan-
dard student population and our Thai participants are signi￿cantly older than
our Vietnamese participants (t=3.32, p<0.01). In both locations our partic-
ipants come from families with around ￿ve members. Our Thai participants
had spent and average of 18.24 years in the slums and our Vietnamese par-
ticipants had lived in the slums 21.82 years, on average. These last statistics
imply that our participants had spent approximately half their lives in the
slums.
The last demographic statistic we collected was formulated from three ques-
tions taken from two standard psychological scales used to measure cooper-
ative predispositions, the AB5C: II+/I- and the NEO: A4. 10 We included
the Cooperation Scale to account for possible selection problems driven by
cooperative personalities that might be distributed non-randomly. As it turns
out, the Thais seem to have been more cooperatively predisposed (t=4.50,
p<0.01). Because we needed to keep the post-experiment survey brief, the
9 Alternatively, notice that sanctions impose no material harm on free riders so
they should be ignored by payoﬀ maximizing players.
10 Each of these two psychological scales have high Cornbach alpha values (0.73 for
both) which measure the extent to which the scales capture a single unidimensional
latent construct ￿ cooperativeness in this case.
10scale consisted of adding the following three items (+ means the item was
scored positively for agreeing and ￿ means the opposite):
It is better to cooperate than compete. (+)
People should listen to their conscience when making decisions. (+)
I ti sa m u s i n gt op l a yt r i c k so no t h e rp e o p l e .( - )
In our post-experiment interview we gathered data on our participants￿ asso-
ciational social capital. The existing evidence suggests that home ownership
provides people an anchor in the community they would not otherwise have
(Sampson et al. (1997), Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999)). Own Home is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one for people who own their homes. Home
ownership is signi￿cantly higher in Vietnam (t=3.42, p<0.01). We expected
people who own their own homes would be more vested in the community and
therefore more cooperative and more likely to show their disapproval of free
riding. We expected that people from more homogeneous communities will
be more cooperative with and more likely to punish other members of their
￿ingroup￿ (Cardenas and Carpenter (2001)). Community Homogeneity mea-
sures the respondent￿s perception of the ethnic composition of her community.
Ethnic homogeneity is perceived to be particularly low in Vietnam and the
between country diﬀerence is signi￿cant (t=3.53, p<0.01).
Many of our communities organize projects each year to clean up or improve
the conditions of the slum. Participation in these projects is voluntary and
t h e r e f o r ep e o p l eh a v et h ei n c e n t i v et of r e er i d e .Participate in Community
Project equals one if the respondent or someone in the respondent￿s family
participated in the project. According to respondents in both countries par-
ticipation in these projects is very close to one hundred percent which can
not be reconciled with casual conversations with community members. This
inconsistency illustrates the problem with surveyed self-reports.
Chat is a likert scale response to the question: ￿How often do you chat or spend
time together with other people in your community?￿ Describe,a l s om e a s u r e d
on a likert scale, is the response to the question: How do you describe your
neighbors who are not relatives? The responses to this question varied between
(1) like strangers to (3) like family. Finally, we were also able to identify
people who were politically active in the communities. Leader of Community
is a dummy which takes the value of one for anyone who our collaborators
identi￿ed as a community leader (e.g. ward leaders in Vietnam). We see that
we recruited more leaders in Thailand (t=2.45, p<0.02), the Vietnamese were
more connected to their neighbors, on average (t=5.58, p<0.01), and both
groups described their neighbors as being mostly like family.
In terms of summary statistics, both groups of participants contributed at
11very high levels in our experiment. Our Thai participants average contribu-
tion, pooling all ten rounds, was 6.72 of their 10 coin endowment and the
Vietnamese contributed even more ￿ 7.41 of their 10 bill endowment. The dif-
ference in aggregate behavior is signi￿cant (t=2.36, p<0.02) indicating that
the Vietnamese are more trusting and cooperative. Additionally, both groups
signal their disapproval of free riding at high levels given the behavior is costly
and in￿icts no material harm on the free riders. Approximately, one third of
the Thai show disapproval and a quarter of the Vietnamese disapprove.
Figures 1 and 2 provide a better sense of the dynamics of the interactions in
the two locations. Figure 1 presents average contribution levels in the exper-
iments pooled at the country level. In contrast to other similar experiments
conducted in the west with students (see Ledyard (1995) for a survey), con-
tribution rates among slum dwellers are high and tend to increase over time,
even in the absence of punishment. It is hard to say whether punishment in-
creases contributions or they simply continue to increase from periods 6 to 10.
Interestingly, the Thais contribute signi￿cantly less initially, but converge on
the Vietnamese contribution rate by the ￿fth round of the experiment. It is
also interesting to note that neither the Thais nor the Vietnamese data show
the standard end-game drop oﬀ in contributions that we typically see in this
experiment.
Figure 2 graphs the fraction of individuals who socially disapprove of free
riding in periods 6 through 9. Close to 40% of Thais sanction and 30% of
Vietnamese sanction. Disapproval rates fall over time but so does free riding
so this trends is better explained by the lessened need for sanctions than by
learning that sanctions should have no eﬀect. Another piece of evidence that
supports this view of disapproval is that the Vietnamese sanction less in each
period that the Thais, but they also suﬀer less from free riding than the Thais
in every period.
We were astonished by the increasing rates of contributions and wondered if
our ￿eld protocol, which framed the encounter as contributing to a commu-
nity project, could be responsible for such high contributions rates. To test
this hypothesis, we conducted nine control sessions using the same protocol
with Middlebury College students. 11 As the reader can see, the Middlebury
contribution data in the ￿rst ￿ve periods show the anticipated decline in con-
tributions and the standard end-game eﬀect indicating that the protocol can
not explain the high contribution rates among our slum dwellers. There is,
however, a marked eﬀect of the social disapproval treatment, at least initially.
Contributions among Middlebury students increase substantially in anticipa-
11 Again, we tried to balance the gender composition of our groups. We were only
slightly less successful. Our sample of nine groups is composed of three all men
groups, two all women groups, and four mixed groups.
12tion of social disapproval, and decline again at a slower pace as players learn
that disapproval has no negative ￿nancial consequences. We also see the end-
game drop in contributions at the end of the second ￿ve periods. 12
4 Analyses at the Individual Level
Our experiment generates a panel of data ￿ 240 individuals over 10p e r i o d s .
To account for individual heterogeneity over time, we use the random eﬀects
model. Because contributions are bound from below by zero and from above by
ten, we also use the tobit estimator for our trust/cooperation analysis. Lastly,
because our social sanction variable is binary, we use the logit estimator for our
analysis of why individuals show disapproval. We build our empirical models
in two steps. In our initial regressions we include only individual demographics
as regressors. In the second step we add our measures of associational social
capital to test whether there are any links between behavior and the network
connectedness of our participants.
Table 2 presents the results of our analysis of contributions in the two cities. Al-
most all the demographics play a signi￿cant role in determining contributions.
In Bangkok, contrary to most people￿s prior, men contribute signi￿cantly more
than woman, schooling appears to teach people to free ride because an addi-
tional year of education reduces one￿s contribution by 0.14 coins (0.7 Bhat),
and there does not appear to be a relationship between age and contribu-
tions. However, in an unreported regression that restricts the eﬀect of age to
be linear, we ￿nd that contributions are signi￿cantly decreasing in age (the
coeﬃcient is ￿0.04, p<0.01). In addition, participants from larger families in
Bangkok contribute less, those who have been in the slums longer contribute
less, and those who score higher on the cooperation personality scale do con-
tribute signi￿cantly more.
Many of the signi￿cant eﬀects carry exactly the opposite sign in Ho Chi
Minh City. Women contribute more, more schooling leads to higher contribu-
tions, and contributions are concave in age with the empirically contribution-
maximizing age at 33 years. Among the Vietnamese, people from larger house-
holds contribute more and it appears that duration in the slum reduces con-
tributions as in Bangkok, however, we note that this sign and the one on the
cooperation scale ￿ip when we add the associational social capital regressors.
In the second set of regressions we add the associational variables. The addi-
12 Note our Middlebury results are similar to Masclet et al. (2003) who ￿nd that
directed social sanctions, which also carry no material consequence for free riders,
improve contributions but the eﬀect is decreasing over time.
13tion of these variables has little eﬀect on many of our demographic results but
does add signi￿cantly to our estimates. In Bangkok, men remain more cooper-
ative and larger households, and long time residents of the slums, remain less
cooperative, but now the eﬀect of education and the cooperation scale lose
signi￿cance. Contrary to our priors, home ownership reduces cooperation, but
people who perceive their communities to be homogeneous cooperate more (in
line with the ingroup hypothesis) and people who claim to have been active
in the community before also cooperate more. The other coeﬃcients are not
signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero. These results suggest there are some links
between network density and behavior in Bangkok.
In Ho Chi Minh City, as in Bangkok, most of the demographic results survive
the addition of omitted variables. However, we see that now our results sug-
gest that participants who reside in the slums longer become more cooperative
and that the cooperation personality scale does predict cooperation in the ex-
periment. Considering the associational variables, we see that, like Bangkok,
homeownership reduces cooperation. Interestingly, the Vietnamese react op-
positely to homogeneity ￿ people who perceive the slum as more homogeneous
contribute less. Also, of note is the fact that we ￿nd negative coeﬃcients on the
remaining network regressors. People who claim to volunteer for community
service contribute less, and those who report chatting with their neighbors
more often and describe their neighbors more like family are less cooperative.
Lastly, it is the case that community leaders in Vietnam lead by example ￿
the coeﬃcient is positive and signi￿cant.
In terms of the economic signi￿cance of these results, compared to the coun-
try average contributions, men in Thailand give 15% more than women, but
women in Vietnam give 26% more than men. A high school education yields
no prosocial returns in Bangkok, but in Vietnam, this level of educational at-
tainment increases contributions by 34%. At the average duration in the slum,
Thais contribute 8% less while the Vietnamese in a similar situation contribute
15% more indicating that slum life might bring out the cooperativeness of the
Vietnamese and attenuate it among the Thai. Homeownership reduces contri-
butions in both locations by approximately 20% while parochialism increases
contributions in Bangkok by 30% and reduces it in Ho Chi Minh City by 4%.
Most of our contribution results are in line with conventional wisdom, but
there are two anomalies: homeownership reduces contributions in both loca-
tions and men contribute more than women in Thailand. Although the mar-
ginal eﬀects are highly signi￿cant in both locations, we do not put a lot of
faith in our homeownership variable because many of the people who report
owning their homes are, in fact, squatting which means they could never trans-
late their ownership into ￿nancial capital and have little incentive to invest in
their property. This also indicates, that many of the reasons for ownership to
aﬀect social capital (i.e., having a ￿nancial stake in the community) apply to
14few of our respondents.
As it turns out, the stereotype of Thai men is that they are notorious gam-
blers. With this information in mind, we thought that one explanation of
behavior in Bangkok might be that men were treating our experiment like a
blackjack table. After a few sessions, we started asking people, at the end of
the interview, what the game reminded them of. We expected that if our hy-
pothesis was true that men would disproportionately respond with a comment
having to do with gambling. We received six responses from 44 participants:
being helpful (14%), a community project (32%), nothing (24%), cooperation
(8%), an investment (18%), and sports (4%). Nobody explicitly mentioned
gambling and the distribution of responses by men is actually skewed slightly
more towards the cooperative descriptions, although the means (generated by
ranking the responses from least to most cooperative) are not signi￿cantly dif-
ferent (t=0.33, p=0.74). This suggests that gambling is not the right answer
and men appear to be sincerely more cooperative in Thailand.
In Table 2 we report our social disapproval results. Overall, we have less to
report concerning the willingness to sanction free riders. However, there are
a few interesting results. Considering ￿rst the demographic determinants of
social disapproval by themselves, we see that sending a message to the rest of
the group is concave in age in Thailand and that Thais from larger households
are less likely to sanction the group. Speci￿cally, a standard deviation increase
in the size of the household reduces the probability of showing disapproval by
73%. However, this eﬀect is not robust to the addition of our other regressors.
In Vietnam, none of the demographics explain social disapproval, however, one
alternative explanation is highly signi￿cant. The regressor Var(Cont) is the
group-level variance in contributions. We see that the Thai appear immune
t ot h ev a r i a n c ei nc o n t r i b u t i o n s ,b u tt h eV i e t n a m e s eb e h a v ea sw ew o u l de x -
pect ￿ when the variance increases (e.g., the group is split between free riders
and contributors), the Vietnamese are more likely to show disapproval. Lastly,
Contribution is the amount contributed by the individual deciding to signal
disapproval or not. In other experiments in which people can punish free rid-
ers, we see a strong result between contributing and punishing (e.g., Carpenter
(2002b)), but this result does not translate into our social disapproval situa-
tion. Cooperators seem just as likely as free riders to disapprove of the group￿s
behavior.
A few additional correlations emerge when we add the associational social
capital variables to the Thai regression. Sanctioning remains concave in age,
and now duration in the slum predicts disapproval (the higher the duration
the more likely you are to show disapproval), but the eﬀect of household size
diminishes. People who perceive the slum to be more homogeneous are less
likely to show disapproval, as are those who claim to have participated in
15a community project. Lastly, the more one chat￿s with her neighbors, the
less likely she is to show disapproval. These results suggest that associations
dampen one￿s willingness to speak out against free riding in Thailand.
The addition of the social capital variables has little eﬀect on the Vietnamese
estimate of social disapproval. In fact, the regressors are jointly not diﬀerent
from zero. Again, however, most of the estimation is driven by the variance
in contributions, but there is a marginally signi￿cant eﬀect of ties to one￿s
neighbors. The eﬀect is the opposite of what we see in the Thai data. The
more contact a Vietnamese player has with her neighbors, the more likely she
is to speak out against free riding indicating that the Vietnamese become more
emboldened when they are close to their neighbors.
5 Comparisons Between the Thai and the Vietnamese
In unreported regressions we also stacked the two data sets from tables 2
and 3, added Thai dummy variables and generated interactions between the
dummies and all our regressors so that we could identify any signi￿cant dif-
ferences between the responses of our Thai participants and their Vietnamese
counterparts. In fact, there are a number of interesting results.
In general, chi-squared tests of the joint signi￿cance of the demographic diﬀer-
ences in both cooperation and social disapproval can not be rejected nor can
s i m i l a rt e s t sf o rd i ﬀerences in the associational social capital variables. 13 More
speci￿cally, we ￿nd that, with respect to our cooperation demographics, Thai
men are signi￿cantly more cooperative, schooling has a signi￿cantly greater
eﬀect in Vietnam, as does age. In terms of the eﬀects of associational social
capital, Thais are aﬀected signi￿cantly diﬀerently than Vietnamese when it
comes to homogeneity, participation in community projects, and their inter-
actions with their neighbors. Thais cooperate more in homogeneous groups
while the Vietnamese cooperate less, the Thais cooperate more when they
have participated in a community project before and the Vietnamese cooper-
ate less, and the Vietnamese cooperate less than the Thais when they seem
to be in good standing with their neighbors.
Because the only thing that seems to in￿uence the Vietnamese decision to
show disapproval is the variance in group contributions, many of the demo-
graphic and social capital estimates are signi￿cantly diﬀerent. As is obvious,
13 The contribution statistic is chi2=136.99 for the demographic diﬀerences and
chi2=172.18 for the social capital diﬀerences. The disapproval statistics are lower
because of the less precise estimates (chi2=19.06 for demographics and chi2=17.97
for social capital), but are still signi￿cant at the 1%l e v e l .
16t h eV i e t n a m e s ec a r es i g n i ￿cantly more about the variance in contributions,
but schooling, age and household size all matter signi￿cantly more for the
Thais who disapprove more the more schooling they have had, disapprove
m o r ea n dt h e nl e s sa st h e yg e to l d e r ,a n dd i s a p p r o v el e s si ft h e yc o m ef r o m
larger families.
These cultural diﬀerences also exist in the network variables. The Thais are
signi￿cantly less likely to sanction the group if they claim to own their own
homes, come from more homogeneous communities, or have participated in
a community project in the last year. However, they are signi￿cantly more
likely to disapprove if they chat more often with their neighbors. Lastly, as
we would expect given the laissez faire nature of Thai culture and the heavy
hand of the Vietnamese state, leaders in Vietnam are signi￿cantly more likely
to signal disapproval.
6 Discussion
We content that the hypothetical nature of many behavioral survey questions
used to measure social capital introduces noise and biases that limit the cred-
ibility of this research program. As a partial solution we conduct experiments
in the ￿eld with people who live in urban slums to measure behavioral social
capital and to see how behavior in the context of monetary incentives varies
with demographic factors and associational survey measures of social capital.
Overall, we ￿nd very high rates of contributions that do not decrease over
time among Thai and Vietnamese participants in a voluntary contribution
game and we see that many participants are willing to socially sanction other
participants who free ride even though these sanctions are costly to impose
and in￿ict no monetary harm on the targets.
At the individual level, we ￿nd that trust and cooperation vary with sex,
schooling, age, household size, years of residence in the slum and a psycho-
logical cooperation scale. Additionally, we ￿nd that behavior correlates with
home ownership, community homogeneity, past participation in community
projects, the relationship between players and their neighbors, and commu-
nity leadership. We also see that a person￿s willingness to show disapproval of
free riding is determined by age, the variance in group level contributions, and
a number of our measures of network density. However, many of these corre-
lations diﬀer signi￿cantly between our Thai participants and our Vietnamese
participants indicating a role of culture.
Our experiments generate two mysteries: why do the Thai and Vietnamese
contributions not decline over time and why do participants socially sanc-
tion others when this behavior is costly and carries no punch? The obvious
17explanation of the diﬀerence in the Thai and Vietnamese contribution rates
compared to our Middlebury student controls is that Thai and Vietnamese
culture is more cooperative and trusting (i.e., the individualist versus the col-
lectivist predisposition). In fact there is some broad evidence of East-West
diﬀerences in cooperation and trust in the experimental literature (Hemesath
and Pomponio (1998), Buchan et al. (2000)), and one study is particularly rel-
evant. Parks and Vu (1994) compare undergraduates from the United States
to recent immigrants from Vietnam in a public goods setting and ￿nd, as we
do, that the Vietnamese are substantially more cooperative and the rate of
cooperation does not decline with repetition.
The increasing contribution rates might also be explained by the high initial
levels of cooperation and conformity. As shown elsewhere (Carpenter (2002c)),
groups that tend to have few free riders at the beginning remain cooperative
because there is some tendency to conform to what others are doing in the
experiment. Hence, if the initial contribution levels are high, as we see in ￿gure
1, and our Asian participants are particularly conformist minded (as suggested
by Huang and Harris (1973) and Kim and Markus (1999)) then the experiment
can settle on a cooperative outcome as the result of some boundedly rational
learning/conformism dynamic.
The second puzzle is why our participants tend to socially sanction the other
group members for free riding. We can think of two possible explanations.
First, there is considerable work on what has been called, expressive voting,
which is the idea that people vote to voice their opinions even when they
know that the probability that theirs is the determining vote is small (e.g.,
Brennan and Lomasky (1993) or Tyran (2002)). It may be the case that our
participants understand that there is no cost to the other participants when
they express their disapproval and yet they do it anyway because they feel the
need to express their moral disapproval.
An alternative, but related explanation, relates to the research described in
Carpenter and Matthews (2002) who show that people in a voluntary contri-
bution setting will pay to punish free riders in a completely separate group
even though the punishers can never bene￿t from higher contributions in the
other group. The authors call this behavior social reciprocity and de￿ne it
as the act of demonstrating one￿s disapproval, at some personal cost, for the
violation of a widely-held norm like not free riding. Our participants￿ behav-
ior is consistent with social reciprocity because showing disapproval is costly
a n dc a nn o tb ee x p e c t e dt oy i e l da n yb e n e ￿ts. Given the prevalence of this
behavior in the experimental lab, it is not surprising to also witness it in the
￿eld.
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Fig. 2. Fraction Showing Disapproval at the Country Level.
23Table 1 – Demographics, Social Capital Indices, and Experimental Behavior 
  Bangkok  Ho Chi Minh City 
  obs. mean s.d.  obs. mean s.d. 
Demographics        
Participant  Sex  (1=male)  120 0.50 0.50 120 0.50 0.50 
Participant Years of Schooling  120  6.92  1.14  120  9.67  3.42 
Participant  Age  120 40.98  13.71 120 35.10  13.69 
Household  Size  119 4.97 2.43 120 5.43 2.44 
Years of Slum Residence  119  18.24  13.20  118  21.82  13.73 
Cooperation Scale (6 (high) to -6 (low))  120  2.80  0.56  120  2.34  0.47 
Associational Social Capital        
Own Home (1=Yes)  120  0.76  0.43  120  0.92  0.28 
Community Homogeneity (1=high)  118  0.21  0.41  102  0.05  0.22 
Participate in Community Project (1=Yes)  116  0.92  0.27  114  0.93  0.26 
Chat (Likert scale 1 (low) to 4 (high))  119  3.36  0.72  120  3.81  0.51 
Describe (Likert scale 1 (low) to 3 (high))  119  3.44  0.50  120  3.46  0.53 
Leader of Community (1=Yes)  120  0.17  0.37  120  0.07  0.25 
Experimental Behavior        
Average Cooperation in the Experiment  120  6.72  2.41  120  7.41  2.10 
Fraction of Individuals who Disapprove  120  0.34  0.47  120  0.25  0.43 
 
24Table 2 – Dependent variable is either an individual’s contribution in a given round 
(results are random effects Tobit) 
 
  Demographics Only  Demographics and Social Capital 
Indices 
  BKK HCM BKK HCM 
  coeff. s.e.  coeff. s.e.  coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. 
Male 2.13***  0.29  -1.36***  0.21  1.04***  0.22  -1.93*** 0.28 
Schooling  -0.14** 0.07  0.15*** 0.04  0.04  0.04 0.21*** 0.03 
Age -0.02  0.05  0.39***  0.05  -0.07  0.05  0.08*  0.05 
Age^2 -0.0002  0.0005  -0.006*** 0.001  0.001*** 0.000  -0.001*  0.000 
Household  -0.15** 0.07  0.15*** 0.05  -0.25*** 0.04 0.21*** 0.08 
Residence  -0.06*** 0.01  -0.03*** 0.01  -0.03*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 
Coop.  Scale  0.49* 0.28 -0.25**  0.11 0.30  0.25 0.17* 0.10 
Own         -1.22***  0.33  -1.82*** 0.31 
Homogeneous         1.99***  0.26  -0.32**  0.13 
Participate        2.99***  0.35  -2.82*** 0.43 
Chat         0.08  0.14  -1.19*** 0.19 
Describe         -0.27  0.21  -0.55*** 0.19 
Leader         0.18  0.37  1.21**  0.60 
obs.  1180 1180 1100 1120 
Prob > chi
2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(Notes: Contributions are bound from below by 0 and from above by 10.  * indicates
significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.) 
 
25Table 3 – Dependent variable is one if the individual shows disapproval
(results are random effects Logit) 
 
  Demographics Only  Demographics and Social Capital 
Indices 
  BKK HCM BKK HCM 
  m.e. s.e. m.e. s.e. m.e. s.e. m.e. s.e. 
Contribution  -0.03 0.09 -0.03 0.09 0.07 0.09 -0.02 0.10 
Var(Cont)  0.01  0.05 0.14*** 0.05  -0.02  0.05 0.12*** 0.05 
Male  0.02 0.63 -0.02 0.47 0.35 0.58 -0.22 0.53 
Schooling  0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.08 
Age  0.28***  0.10 -0.13 0.11  0.39***  0.15 -0.08 0.12 
Age^2  -0.002*  0.001 0.002 0.001  -0.002**  0.001 0.001 0.002 
Household  -0.30***  0.11 0.02 0.09 -0.19 0.12 0.06 0.11 
Residence  0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02  0.06**  0.02 0.02 0.02 
Coop.  Scale  -0.21 0.46 -0.01 0.24 -0.86 0.87 0.04 0.26 
Own         -0.08  0.80  1.15  1.05 
Homogeneous          -1.36**  0.54 -0.22 0.40 
Participate         -3.70**  1.84  0.68  1.12 
Chat         -0.64*  0.37  1.27*  0.67 
Describe          0.82 0.54 -0.04 0.51 
Leader         -0.97  0.87  1.51  1.02 
obs.  472 472 440 448 
Prob > chi
2  0.00 0.04 0.00 0.14 
(Notes: Marginal effects are reported.  * indicates significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at
1%.) 
 
26